

UNCLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE, AUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES AND LEAKS

In recent years US intelligence has been under steadily growing pressure from both the Executive and Legislative Branches to sanitize or declassify intelligence information and assessments and make them available "to the American people." Where it has been possible to do this without risk to intelligence sources and methods, we have been accommodating. For example:

- For more than a dozen years, the Community each year has provided to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress detailed assessments of the Soviet and Chinese economies, which are then declassified by the agencies and subsequently circulated widely by the Congress.
- CIA has for many years made available publicly a large volume of reference materials and statistical information on foreign countries. This included, for example, basic economic data on the Soviet Union, but also much more comprehensive documents such as the World Factbook.

The Community also has attempted in an orderly manner to make available for public discussion and use information on priority national security issues. Perhaps the best example of this, and the most widely disseminated, has been the publication

Soviet Military Power, prepared by DIA but closely coordinated by CIA. Additionally, at the request of both the Congress and the White House, last summer for the first time the Intelligence Community presented in open hearing an unclassified version of the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic forces.

Information on other critical issues has been made publicly available (repeatedly) as well. For example, there have been two extraordinary white papers produced on Soviet involvement in technology transfer, dealing with how the Soviets are organized to acquire Western technology both legally and illegally as well as their priorities and targets. The Community also has prepared a series of white papers on terrorism, issued under State Department auspices. White papers on terrorism have been prepared addressing specific subjects such as terrorism directed against businessmen, terrorist acts against diplomats, and so forth.

On other issues, information has been made available on a limited basis when necessary to informed debate or discussion. This has been the case, for example, with both CIA and DIA publications on Soviet work on SDI-type technologies and also on Nicaragua. The first public presentation of the Soviet and Cuban support for a military buildup in Nicaragua and other internal developments in that country was conducted in early 1982 by then DDCI Inman and John Hughes of DIA. There have been periodic updates of this information since that time. Unclassified white papers on Qadhafi's worldwide support for terrorism and subversion also have been prepared.

Finally, CIA has in preparation major unclassified studies on the Soviet military industrial complex and the Soviet propaganda apparatus. We also are giving consideration to the possible production of unclassified intelligence on various aspects of the Soviet economy.

In sum, the Community has a wide ranging program to provide unclassified intelligence assessments on key issues when the White House, the Congress, or both believe greater information must be made available to the public to enhance understanding of national policy. It is important to emphasize, however, that in each of the above stated cases the decision to sanitize and release the information has been made at the highest levels of the American government and the preparation of those papers has involved careful coordination within the Intelligence Community to ensure that there is no compromise of intelligence sources and methods. Some barriers have never been breached. For example, we have never released satellite photography in any unclassified form.

This disciplined, orderly and cautious approach to the public use of intelligence information with the guidance of the highest authorities of the government and with the close participation of intelligence professionals stands in decided contrast to the risks and dangers involved in unauthorized disclosures or leaks by individuals, whatever their motive. When individuals unilaterally decide to release information without consultation with appropriate US Intelligence officials, there are two dangers. The first is the high probability that

intelligence sources and methods will be compromised and sensitive means of access to our adversaries' intentions lost -- not to mention the danger to the lives of human agents. The second danger is that when an individual can decide alone to reveal intelligence information, there can be no discipline and no security.

Time and again, intelligence officers have told both policymakers and members of Congress that if there is a need to use intelligence information publicly, we are happy to work with them to make that possible. There are only rare instances where we cannot be helpful in some regard. And when we cannot, it is for good reason.

The public use of intelligence information requires careful consideration and coordination. It should not be off-the-cuff by either policymakers or members of Congress, but based on a realistic calculation of the risks and benefits as well as the safeguarding of sources and methods. The Community has been extremely forthcoming in recent years in providing policymakers and members of Congress with intelligence information they could use publicly to help educate and inform constituents. There are no grounds for alleging noncooperation and therefore the need to act unilaterally. By the same token, we are more than happy to have our work issued under the seal of the State Department, the Defense Department, the White House or the Congress.

Finally, it is both dismaying and destructive to read in the press evaluations of intelligence performance or operations from either the Executive Branch or Congressional sources --

particularly when we devote considerable effort to getting such feedback directly. Discussions of US intelligence operations in any form is harmful. It undermines the confidence of other services in our ability to maintain confidentiality. It almost certainly discourages potential agents and it produces both cynicism and potentially diminished discipline within our own ranks.

Intelligence is prepared to work extremely closely with policymakers in both the Executive and Legislative Branches not only to provide information (and when appropriate even to do so publicly), but also to respond to appropriate inquiries about our conduct of intelligence business. However, except where a conscious decision is made by the appropriate Executive Branch officials and the oversight bodies in the Congress, the effectiveness of American intelligence can only suffer in the media's glare.